Behind Alarmist Portrayals of Rising Islamism in Bangladesh
The Fears Appear to be Overstated and Counterproductive
By Vishal Arora and Harshita Rathore
Newsreel Asia Perspective
October 30, 2024
A wall near Dhaka University is covered in graffiti / Photo by Vishal Arora, Newsreel Asia
If you tune into mainstream media, especially in India, you might find yourself asking, “What the heck is going on in Bangladesh?” With that same question in mind, we left Delhi for Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. However, our six-day journey through Dhaka and Dinajpur left us feeling more hopeful than fearful about Bangladesh’s future.
Think about the mindset we had as we set off for Dhaka, bombarded with headlines like “Is India Ready to Deal With the New March of Islamism in Bangladesh?” “Bangladesh on the Verge of Becoming a Radical Islamic State, Jamaat Reigns Supreme,” and “‘American Puppet’ Muhammad Yunus Panders to Islamists in Bangladesh.”
What We Experienced
It was nothing like we had imagined—fearing we might be targeted by Bangladeshi citizens because of our Indian identity or because we are non-Muslims.
The first surprise was how smoothly we got our journalist visas from the Bangladesh High Commission in Delhi, and the smiling faces and warm gestures of the immigration officers at Dhaka airport.
In Dhaka, what we experienced was the vibrant life—busy markets, children heading to school, packed restaurants, traffic jams. Often, walking alongside locals through narrow lanes and alleys turned out to be the fastest way to get around. Occasionally, people would politely ask, “Your country name?” Upon learning we were from India, they’d simply smile and say, “Good.”
The biggest challenge turned out to be the language barrier, not our religious identity or nationality. We could speak just a couple of sentences in their language, thanks to ChatGPT: “Ami Bangla boli na. Apni English kotha bola jana?” (I don’t speak Bangla. Do you speak English?).
Despite the challenges, we managed to meet and spend time with local journalists, student protest leaders, officials from the interim government, leaders of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and members of minority communities. Luckily, many of them responded with a “yes” to “Apni English kotha bola jana?”
From our conversations with them, three strong points emerged that contradicted the alarming reports of rising Islamism in Bangladesh—reports that could benefit the ousted Awami League by discrediting the opposition and justifying its authoritarian tactics. By framing the political turmoil as a threat to secularism and minority rights, the Awami League and its supporters might be aiming to maintain support from international partners, we suspected.
Before we dive into the three points, let’s quickly lay out the context.
The Context
On June 5, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh overturned a 2018 government decision that had eliminated a 30% civil service quota for descendants of freedom fighters. By July 1, students rallied under the Anti-Discrimination Students’ Movement banner, and began organising widespread demonstrations and sit-ins throughout Dhaka.
By mid-July, the situation heated up when Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina labelled the protesters as descendants of the “Razakar,” an anti-independence group in the 1970s. This accusation cranked up the tension, leading to intense clashes involving the protesters, police and reportedly Awami League supporters. The violence hit its peak between July 16 and July 20, resulting in at least 122 protesters killed. By then, opposition parties and people from all walks of life had joined the protests.
Despite the Supreme Court cutting back most of the quota on July 21, the protests only gained momentum as calls for broader democratic reforms ramped up, and more students and others were killed. Everything came to a head on Aug. 5, when the Prime Minister resigned, which led to her residence being stormed and her fleeing to India. Shortly after she left, there were numerous attacks on Hindu, Christian, Buddhist, Ahmadi and indigenous minorities, creating the impression that the safety of these minorities had been solely due to the rule of the Awami League.
Yet, we found that there’s a near-unanimous agreement among the Bangladeshi people that the Awami League, which held power for about 15 and a half years until Aug. 5, was highly authoritarian, nepotistic and corrupt, despite claiming to be the only secular party in a predominantly Muslim country.
In contrast, the opposition BNP was branded as pro-Pakistan, allegedly by India, as we were told, and the Jamaat-e-Islami was opposed to the 1971 liberation war, which led to Bangladesh (then known as East Pakistan) gaining independence from Pakistan (then West Pakistan) with India’s assistance.
Therefore, the pressing question in foreign media coverage of Bangladesh now is whether the country will tilt toward becoming an Islamic state or if Islamism will increase, especially after the ousting of the ostensibly secular party.
Now, let’s dwell on the first point.
(1) Democratic Aspirations, Not Islamist Assertions, Are the Driving Force
The Anti-Discrimination Students’ Movement, a politically non-affiliated group, started the protests. Initially, they were against only the reinstatement of the quota, but their demands soon expanded to include democratic reforms largely due to the killings of students and other protesters. The movement was inclusive, drawing support from various segments of society and focusing on governance issues rather than religious ideology or references to Islam.
We detected no traces of Islamism among the student movement leaders. Instead, we couldn’t ignore the possible influence of Left ideology on some student leaders, at least at a subconscious level. We met at least one key leader who had been involved with the Students’ Federation of Bangladesh. Besides, the protest leaders’ strong emphasis on democracy, civil freedoms and equality, coupled with their “anti-fascism” stance, suggested at least some Leftist influence.
Further, as we travelled across Bangladesh, we noticed graffiti on walls along the roads and streets bearing messages like “New Bangladesh,” “Inclusion,” “Democracy,” and “Religion Should not Be Equated with the State” – messages that have nothing to do with Islamism.
Secularism Not Under Threat
A wall and a gate, covered in graffiti, near Dhaka University / Photo by Harshita Rathore, Newsreel Asia
The ongoing movement isn’t about challenging the purported secularism of the Awami League or India’s influence through Hasina’s party, nor is it advocating for a greater role of Islam to counter her party’s corruption. Instead, it’s focused on combating the “fascism” of the Awami League, with a strong call for structural changes to prevent any party, individual or family from turning authoritarian in the future.
Umama Fatema, the spokesperson for the Anti-Discrimination Students’ Movement, told us that the movement was for democracy and democratic rights, with a focus on inclusion regarding the future direction of Bangladesh.
But then why did hundreds of attacks on minorities occur? We posed this question to students at Dhaka University. They suspect that many of these attacks were possibly orchestrated by Awami League supporters. Some were instigated by local politicians for local reasons, and a few were carried out by Islamist groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Ansarullah Bangla, both of which are banned in the country.
Further, the students argued that the Awami League was not truly secular, referring to several incidents of violence against minorities between 2013 and 2016, and more recently in 2021. They added that party leaders have seized land from minorities, describing the party’s relations with these groups as a “patron-client” relationship.
The students also mentioned that soon after Hasina’s ouster, they helped establish local committees – just as political parties including Jamaat-e-Islami also did – to protect Hindu temples and other minority places of worship.
‘Zero Tolerance Towards Extremist Islamists’
Everyone we met in Bangladesh acknowledged that the minorities were at risk – students from minority communities promptly left for their hometowns and several families attempted to flee the country out of fear. But they were firmly against the attacks on them.
Some Islamist groups initially increased their presence online because they were suppressed for a long time, Shafiqul Alam, Press Secretary to the Chief Adviser (head) of the interim government of Bangladesh, Dr. Muhammad Yunus, told us. However, the interim government maintains zero tolerance towards extremist Islamists; there is no room for any form of extremism in Bangladesh, he said.
The Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees rights and freedoms to everyone, including religious minorities, and that is how Bangladesh will be governed, Alam added.
But will Bangladesh remain a secular country, now that there’s more room for Islamist forces to spread their ideology? This brings us to point number two.
(2) Neither Islamic Parties Nor Islamist Groups Are Calling the Shots
The interim government isn’t just being recognised as the legitimate authority by the majority of Bangladeshis; the students, fervently advocating for democracy, civil rights and equality, seem to be setting the political agenda and leading the nation forward in terms of political values.
Two coordinators from the Anti-Discrimination Students’ Movement—Md. Nahid Islam and Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuiyan—serve as advisors (equivalent to ministers) in the interim government. Moreover, it was the protesting students who advocated for an interim government led by Nobel laureate Dr. Yunus.
The majority of Bangladeshis seem to embrace the leadership of the students, to the extent that their pro-democracy agenda has become the national agenda. Even political parties like the BNP have adjusted their rhetoric to align with the students and the wider public, signalling a significant shift from their previous perceptions.
Political Reform
Shahiduddin Chowdhury Anee, BNP’s Joint Secretary General, encouraged us to read the “31-Point Outline for Structural Reforms in Bangladesh,” which his party recently published. The outline proposes “complete freedom of the press,” “freedom of speech and expression,” “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” “full right to practice religion freely,” “modern and forward-looking youth development policies,” and efforts to “empower women.”
Bangladesh isn’t experiencing the kind of total anarchy that would allow Islamists to exploit a political crisis and seize power through undemocratic means. The government system remains in place and functional, and it’s likely to continue that way.
One might wonder, while students currently seem to lead the charge, could increased freedom for Islamic parties and Islamist groups sway the populace over time? This leads us to point number three.
(3) Islamism Lacks Widespread Appeal in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has several Islamist groups competing against each other, leading to their fragmentation and struggles for dominance, we learned from local journalists. Moreover, the form of Islam practiced in Bangladesh is heavily influenced by Sufism, which focuses on spirituality, and not dogmatism.
Sufism was introduced to the region by saints and missionaries, like Shah Sultan Rumi and Baba Adam Shah Shahid, between the 11th and 12th centuries. These Sufi figures played a key role in spreading Islam throughout the Indian subcontinent by using methods that were inclusive and adapted to local traditions and cultures.
Sufism’s emphasis on experiential faith, rather than textual dogma, made it particularly appealing to the rural populations of the region that is today Bangladesh.
Economy
Moreover, unlike Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh isn’t an oil-producing country; it’s an industrialised nation with a growing economy, though one marked by significant disparities. Here, the elite are focused on business, and the poor are hard at work just making a living – there are over a million rickshaw pullers in the country. So, a new Islamist ideology will be more of a distraction than an attraction for them.
As for the Jamaat-e-Islami, which aims to create an Islamic Bangladesh but has never received more than 10% of the votes in any national election, it seems larger than it actually is. This perception is due to their high visibility from social work and activism. However, as a political party with ambitions, they are compelled to operate within the democratic framework.
Therefore there is no substantial evidence indicating that Islamist groups are poised to gain significant power or that they have the capacity to do so, given their fragmented nature and lack of widespread support.
Given these three points, the fears of widespread Islamism seem to be overstated and counterproductive, not just for Bangladesh but also for India and the larger international community. Such fears undermine the efforts of various segments of Bangladesh’s population and establishment, who are working to build a democratic and prosperous country that aligns with the interests of its neighbours, South Asia and the rest of the world.
For Bangladesh, it is crucial to protect its minorities, institutionalise protections for them, minimise their marginalisation, and curb any attempts to radicalise any section of society. This is essential to prevent the fears of Islamisation from becoming a reality one day.
